As mentioned in a previous article, it’s helpful to organize bowl cases’ key details, primary moral considerations, your team’s position and at least one objection/response using a “case summary matrix” for quick reference and review.
These are good not only for the months leading up to the bowl, but also for coaching between rounds – especially later in the bowl, when many of the cases have already been covered, so your team can identify and focus on those remaining (I’ll draw a line through each as the even unfolds, and we’ll focus post-lunch on the half dozen left).
Here’s a slightly edited version of the case summary matrix my team used for our NHSEB Regional this past weekend. Not every view meshed with my own thinking or even each team member’s individual thinking. But these were roughly the positions and considerations the team developed, studied and initially used (though few views survive the thought experiment curveballs during the judges Q&A) – hoping you find the examples and/or structure helpful.
And if the text is too small or you’d like to use the editable file, just email (matt (at) mattdeaton.com) – happy to share.
Here’s a second guest case analysis from Vancouver, Washington HSEB coach Michael Andersen. Thanks so much for sharing, Michael! Great job once again, this time with some keen insights from the perspective of Virtue Ethics, and a nice quote from Ethics in a Nutshell (open source Ethics Bowl Edition available for all ethics bowl participants here on the Resources page) on Kantianism. And agreed that a good way to open a presentation on this case might be to concede its complexity — many moving parts.
Case #10 “Belief vs. Action” is one that we all can relate to, as we have all heard the saying “People should practice what they preach.” A widely-shared moral intuition is the expectation that our leaders–especially teachers charged with guiding young people into public life–should strive to be moral exemplars (or, at minimum, not hypocrites); and we see it as tarnishing their credibility when their actions consistently and significantly appear to contradict their message. But how demanding must we be of others and ourselves when, on principle, we advocate for more ethical lifestyles (in this case, that of living more sustainably)? Should only moral exemplars in this arena of life take on leadership roles?
Surely our democracy and society can make room for people in leadership positions who are less-than-perfect, whose lifestyles involve some degree of waste and occasional excess. Who among us isn’t habitually wasteful some of the time? More than likely, if our standards are too stringent, then we will attract very few qualified people into such positions. So, to frame our thinking on this case, a bit of practical reasoning helps us see that our assessments of those in positions of leadership or responsibility should (within reason) allow some wiggle room for personal shortcomings and imperfections–if only because we ourselves are imperfect and would similarly face harsh recriminations, should we fail to live up to public standards of whatever constitutes an ethical and sustainable lifestyle. We need qualified people in leadership roles, so together we have a vested interest in refraining from making such positions available only to those who are morally flawless.
When evaluating this concern, the virtues of authenticity (1) and integrity (2) rank high on many peoples’ lists, and adhering to our principles (no surprise) requires us to make sacrifices of convenience or comfort when the situation demands it (like when politicians who advocate for campaign finance reform have to disclose their own campaign contributions). When people in leadership roles, or more broadly in positions of responsibility, behave in ways that seem to run counter to their message or role, then they risk being judged, by others and themselves, as inauthentic and/or lacking integrity. When the contradiction between their stated beliefs and actions is particularly embarrassing or egregious, these are often grounds for dismissing them from the position or demoting their role in an institution, as well as facing a general loss of social status.
At the root of this contradiction-concern are some very powerful intuitions that our species has evolved to navigate our social relations with others, which help to form our shared ideas about the virtues of honesty (3) and trustworthiness (5) (or more specifically the vices of dishonesty and duplicitousness). These concepts are crucial for our shared moral life together, as Kant argued (and Matt Deaton summarized) with his categorical imperative about refraining from lying:
“For example, imagine a world in which people always lied when it was to their advantage. What would happen? Lots of things, but at root, if people always lied, the social convention of trust, which is based on the expectation that people generally tell the truth, would dissolve. This would mean no one would ever take anyone at their word, and therefore there would be no benefit to lying.” (Ethics in a Nutshell: An Intro for Ethics Bowlers, 3rd Edition, p. 27) (5)
When Kayla, the Environmental Ethics teacher in the case #10 description, worries that she “sometimes feels like a fraud,” you could also say that she presently feels “inauthentic,” “lacks integrity,” or is “dishonest” by maintaining a facade of an environmentalist that–she feels–conflicts with the reality of her family’s lifestyle. …It is worth noting in passing that Kayla’s moral character is developed enough that she is sensitive to this apparent contradiction, as she is (justifiably?) concerned what her students will think of her: “If students knew how she lives her daily life, they’d be shocked.” You might conclude that she deserves some reproach for finally deciding to accept the students’ invitation to serve as the adviser to the Environmental Club, despite her apparent contradiction of belief vs. action; but at least she deserves some credit for deliberating on the question in apparent good faith. A good analysis of her situation will take this into account.
Also worth noting here (very briefly, as it’s a complex idea) are the criticisms of Consequentialist Ethics by advocates of Duty Ethics or Care Ethics, who view as insufficient the former framework’s emphasis on consequences alone as the basis for moral judgement. If we were to assess Kayla’s final decision exclusively by the merits of its probable consequences, ignoring completely her inner dialogue about the complexities of her choice, we would be missing something vital about her character and her process of deliberation. For instance, the case description tells us that “Kayla also knows that refraining from eating meat and dairy is one of the most effective ways to reduce her negative impact on the Earth. But her husband and kids love these products, and it’s difficult for the family to cook two separate meals.” This implies that her choices about living sustainably affect, and are affected by, her relationships with her family members, and thereby constrain her autonomy somewhat–at least insofar as she can’t really disown or neglect her husband and children in her desire to align their lifestyle with her environmental principles. (While the case description doesn’t tell us, one wonders how hard she has tried to reasonably convince her family on this point, appealing to their shared responsibility to care for the Earth, and to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, given her public professional role.) In the end, you might find her behavior and judgment lacking; nevertheless, a fair analysis of her motives shows that she appears to feel genuinely conflicted and yearns to do good in the world, which is evident when she concludes that: “Advising the Environmental Club would enable her to do even more good and inspire many more students to advocate for environmental issues and make a difference. Disclosing how she actually lives feels more honest, but it might undermine her work, making people take her arguments less seriously.”
Furthermore, regarding matters of environmentally-friendly living, judgments about personal authenticity and integrity can be tricky, as observers making the judgments are not always partial to private information. Neither is genuine sustainability an easily-achievable standard to live up to. (6) Given that all of us are enmeshed in complex systems of economics and infrastructure (usually not of our own choosing), and that psychologically motivating people to change is fraught with potential pitfalls, is it realistic for Kayla to feel that she’s a fraud because her family’s lifestyle falls short of what her environmental principles demand? Should she actively pressure her family members to live more sustainably, even though this strategy might backfire, causing them to resent her or exacerbate their consumerism and wastefulness? Should she refuse the leadership role until her lifestyle lives up to her own standards? When exactly would that be, and under what specific conditions?
Assuming that Kayla lives in the United States, her options for more sustainable alternatives (like convenient mass transit) and her reliance on a built infrastructure for energy, transportation, food, water, and other necessities is likely to vary, depending on where she lives; but probably her personal ecological footprint will be heavier due to these broader conditions of her life as an American. (7) While some of these factors are within her personal control, some aren’t, and therefore our assessments about the degree that she should feel morally responsible for her lifestyle’s ecological footprint should take these factors into account.
On the other hand, compared to the small ecological footprints of billions of “poor” people in “developing” countries, and the hardships and sacrifices they live with, perhaps Kayla should feel more responsible to align her lifestyle with her principles. One of her core intuitions is that “Surely an essential part of being an environmentalist is living like one.” If this is the case, and billions of people already manage to live more simply, with smaller ecological footprints, then should the present circumstances of Kayla’s life–many of which are a product of her past and present choices–excuse her from the uncomfortable difficulties of aligning her beliefs and actions? Perhaps not, and she just needs to stop making excuses for not trying harder. Surely people currently living in “developed” countries (like, presumably, Kayla does) have a variety of options for learning about and pursuing more sustainable lifestyles–for instance, buying vegan options at the grocery store, purchasing carbon offsets, supporting renewable energy sources, reducing their consumption of wasteful products, etc. Kayla’s own specific awareness of the environmental costs of her family’s lifestyle reveals that (potentially, at least) she has access to educational resources and networks of people to support her transition to an environmentally-friendly lifestyle. (The case description notes that she has an “office” and that she works on “campus”; so it’s likely that she’s a college professor or at least a teacher in a relatively affluent secondary school.)
Perhaps most intriguing for this case, it is worth reflecting whether Kayla’s challenge is merely a personal one. Given the realities of climate change, the environmental degradation we see around us, the alarming loss of biodiversity, and the mountains of waste our society produces, perhaps Kayla’s challenge is our challenge. What do you think? What do the facts of Kayla’s situation (and ours) demand of her (and us)?
Finally, the second study question asks us to think about whether Kayla has a duty to tell her students about her environmentally irresponsible choices Should there be room for her not to disclose her personal shortcomings on privacy grounds? Would hiding such apparent contradictions between her lifestyle and her principles jeopardize her relationship with her students (and the Environmental Club’s reputation in general)? Deciding what should matter most here depends in part on your personal moral convictions, but also on the quality of the supporting reasons and evidence we ought to consider concerning Kayla’s circumstances and her underlying motivations. The supporting reasons and evidence relevant to Kayla’s condition, to our shared ecological challenges, to the long-term sustainability of our way of life, and to the future of our planet’s biosphere deserve your close examination. …Don’t be surprised if the wider context of this case feels dauntingly complex. Perhaps a good start for your team’s position on case #10 is to acknowledge some of this complexity before settling on an answer to Kayla’s dilemma that you judge is the most viable.
The below is a guest analysis by Michael Andersen, a former high school IB Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge teacher currently serving as a volunteer Ethics Bowl coach at the Vancouver School of Arts & Academics here in Vancouver, Washington. It begins with a brief introduction, and goes on to present a very rich analysis with multiple valuable sources and summary explanations — a truly outstanding post. Thank you Michael for taking the time to write this, and for your generosity in sharing it! Every team that reviews it will definitely better appreciate the complexity of case 11, will come away with a new philosophical tool (Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion), and will no doubt have an advantage should they draw it during their bowl. Cheers to all, Matt
Our Ethics Bowl program at VSAA is new this year; however, I have coached Ethics Bowl teams to the Washington State and Oregon Bowls for several years in the past, as well as served as an organizer and judge at the Oregon Bowl. Due to a variety of factors, we can typically only meet once a week, and currently there is no philosophy course at VSAA in which students might receive more Ethics instruction to help them prepare for Ethics Bowl. Since we’re so pressed for time, and our students are new to this activity, I like to use your site and videos, together with Hank Green’s Crash Course Philosophy (1) and the Ethics and Critical Thinking videos at Wireless Philosophy (2) to help lay some groundwork. Thank you for the great work that you do! Our students and my fellow coaches appreciate your time and effort.
Thank you, too, for the invitation to offer some Guest Analysis. I posted the following case exploration to help our students think about the dilemmas inherent in case #11 “Billionaire Backfire.” Perhaps you can use some of this to stimulate thought for other teams, or use some of it as a springboard for your own post on the case.
To begin our reflection on case #11 “Billionaire Backfire,” consider the initial study questions:
When is someone morally praiseworthy for donating money to a charitable cause?
What makes this praiseworthy, when it is?
First, I encourage you to review the (9:46) video Crash Course Philosophy #39 on Moral Luck (3), in which Hank Green explains the difference between moral and causal responsibility, and the reasons we assign praise and blame. Also helpful is the (6:11) Wireless Philosophy video “Ethics: The Problem of Moral Luck” (4), which explores this topic with a few more examples to help you grasp some key issues with the concept of moral responsibility.
Case #11 has particular value for students at Vancouver School of Arts & Academics. The case’s second study question–How does one compare the value of artistic, cultural, or historical artifacts versus the value of human life or well-being?–seems relevant for students and their families interested in supporting the arts (vs. other ways that we could use our money). While some people like to view charitable donations as strictly a personal matter, when the amount donated by philanthropists is sizably large (“more than $1 billion,” as the case description reminds us), and when we live in a society where the gap between rich and poor is the highest in recent history, the prospect of channeling wealth toward a church restoration project over other–arguably more compassionate–ways of doing public good is bound to be contentious. Given the state of global wealth disparity, and the thousands of homeless and refugees desperate for basic necessities, one might sympathize with the question, Shouldn’t the care of these vulnerable people with this $1 billion in charity take priority over meticulously restoring a famous church?
Restoring an iconic building like Notre Dame undoubtedly has public value. And, while important for this case, let’s set aside for a moment the complex question Shouldn’t private donors be free to do what they wish with their own money? Some observers argue that in many countries (particularly in the U.S.) wealth and influence now is so unjustly concentrated in the hands of a tiny privileged elite that a campaign of moral and political pressure to correct this concentration of power is long overdue. Given the widespread public awareness of this disparity between rich and poor, between the powerful influence of a wealthy few and the relative powerlessness of so many vulnerable and destitute people, one can see how large charitable donations for cultural projects like the Notre Dame restoration might deserve some degree of moral scrutiny. (Part of this argument’s force depends on the current political and socio-economic context, with an implicit understanding that, in more stable times, moral scrutiny of such charitable acts might be less justified.)
But perhaps we should scrutinize the underlying assumptions of the criticizing parties as well–if only to better grasp the merits of their critique. Our judgment about whether a philanthropist deserves praise (or blame) for charitable donations requires us to examine closely the giver’s motives and the charitable act’s consequences. The second paragraph of the “Billionaire Backfire” case description points to the motive of “solving larger socio-economic problems, like homelessness and poverty,” and effective altruism’s idea of “[doing] the most good.” This approach implies a type of utilitarian framework of evaluating the morality of actions. In this instance, what would matter most in the evaluation process are the consequences resulting from the billionaires’ charitable acts (i.e., what is attended to and what is neglected); and that we should strive for consequences that maximize happiness equally for everyone. But what actually happens if we always and everywhere prioritize efforts to maximize well-being equally for everyone? Will this guiding principle necessarily result in a better world?
One argument against the view that we should always strive to maximize happiness equally for the greatest number evolves out of a concern about the underlying utilitarian logic illustrated by Derek Parfit’s famous thought experiment of “The Repugnant Conclusion” (5). (NOTE: This links to the detailed and technical article @ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A simpler, more beginner-friendly overview of this thought experiment can be found in this short (5:59) video, where Co-Founder of the Center for Applied Rationality Julia Galef explains this idea: “The Repugnant Conclusion (a philosophy paradox)” (6). For ease of digesting the insight of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, I’ve attached below 4 screenshots from Julia Galef’s overview video that show the main graphs and premises of the Repugnant Conclusion.)
Undoubtedly, Derek Parfit’s thought experiment has stimulated a lot of commentary. The Repugnant Conclusion highlights an apparently unacceptable implication of utilitarian logic and its underlying assumptions for directing moral action–at least in cases where that logic exclusively drives policy decisions affecting real-world population management and wealth distribution. The kind of moral intuitions that this thought experiment interrogates are worth examining carefully, especially for young people concerned with future world conditions, family planning, and exercising altruism effectively.
The Repugnant Conclusion thought experiment relates to “Billionaire Backfire,” especially with Guiding Question #2: How does one compare the value of artistic, cultural, or historical artifacts versus the value of human life or well-being? Assume for a moment that we’re tempted to address this question guided by the principle of maximizing happiness equally for the greatest number. Given the wealth disparity context noted above, and the desperate condition of so many vulnerable citizens and refugees, it seems to follow from this utilitarian approach that we should pressure wealthy philanthropists in cases like this to channel their charitable money toward what effective altruists suggest–that is, “doing the most good” (e.g., addressing “homelessness or water quality over rebuilding Notre Dame”). The motive of maximizing happiness equally for the greatest number would also seem to apply to the priorities of taxpayer money directed at domestic welfare and foreign aid programs.
Applied consistently over time, shifting our charity and welfare priorities in this way seems to result (on first glance at least) in fostering a world that looks like Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, barring some competing directive about population control. Observers of cases like “Billionaire Backfire” often frame the moral tension we feel here as “emphasizing quality of life, even for a privileged few” vs. “equally meeting basic needs for all” (which, many assume, results in population growth). As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on this concept says, “…any loss in the quality of lives in a population can be compensated for by a sufficient gain in the quantity of a population; that is, it leads to the Repugnant Conclusion” (Section 1). (5)
While there is some evidence to suggest that stabilizing vulnerable populations through aid and investment slows down their population growth (7), recent history shows that the world’s population has skyrocketed with widespread access to more material goods and the curtailing of diseases, predators, and lack of basic resources that formerly kept the human population in check. Concerns about always prioritizing quantity of people served through basic welfare over quality of life measures are thus understandable–even if our knowledge about the link between the two is still hazy. So, upon closer examination, determining exactly how we should measure and compare possible good outcomes in a “happiness calculus” appears not to be such an easy problem to solve. Experience has shown that governments and private benefactors can’t solve all of the world’s problems, and clearly there are limits to what charitable donations can accomplish with systemic problems like homelessness and water quality.
These insights lead to the question: What is lost if society generally demands that sizable charitable donations always benefit basic welfare needs over other possible goods? Again, the author of the Stanford Encyclopedia article for this topic helps explain the concern here:
Any finite number of lives in population A can therefore be outweighed by a sufficiently large number of lives in Z because the gain in the quantity of lower values outweighs the loss of certain higher values. However, some theorists—including Parfit—have suggested that this axiological assumption is mistaken. …The idea is that one type of good α can be superior to another type of good β, in the sense that any amount of α is better than any amount of β or that some amount of α is better than any amount of β.
Suppose that what happens as we move down the alphabet from the high-quality population A to the low-quality population Z is that the best things in life are gradually lost. For instance, as Parfit has suggested, the first step from A to B involves the loss of Mozart’s music; in the move from B to C Haydn’s music is lost; in the move to D Venice is destroyed; and so on down the alphabet. All that is left in the final move to Z is “muzak and potatoes”. The claim is that the lives in the beginning of the sequence involve goods that are superior to the goods involved in the lives at the end of the sequence.
The loss of the most worthwhile things in life cannot be compensated for by any gain in the quantity of muzak and potatoes. Consequently, whatever the number of people in population Z, there will be less welfare, or less valuable welfare, in this world as compared to population A and thus the Repugnant Conclusion is blocked. (Section 2.2 Questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare)
At this point, we’re left to ponder some refining questions: What is the most good we can do? and Is it always better in the long run to prioritize meeting basic necessities for a lot of desperate people than to invest resources into artistic or cultural projects that might benefit fewer people–and even then as an aesthetic or inspirational benefit? These are not easy questions even for professional philosophers.
What do you think? Do we diminish the spirit of charitable giving if such gifts are always subject to an effective altruism calculus? Is serving the basic needs of vulnerable people always preferable to fostering culturally beneficial goods?
Looking more closely at the utilitarian directive, you might ask: Do the main versions of utilitarianism actually REQUIRE us to prioritize public or private funding for basic necessities (food, clean water, healthcare, housing) over and above funding for artistic or cultural projects like arts education, restoration of historical or culturally significant artifacts, etc.?
One way many utilitarians try to answer this is by treating the interests of ALL humans (or, more radically, all sentient beings capable of suffering) EQUALLY, and by ranking those interests like Abraham Maslow did with his Hierarchy of Needs. We need basic necessities (water, food, shelter, clothing) first before we can begin to appreciate art or the inspirational value of a historic church like Notre Dame. Others argue that all that is required from a utilitarian approach is maximizing NET happiness. (I won’t go into the weeds here on this, but if you’re curious and want more detail, I’ve linked the Wireless Philosophy Ethics playlist below (2) so you can watch the three short utilitarian vids there, which explore this point with helpful examples.) If only NET happiness matters, then perhaps a minority of people being made extremely happy by funding arts and cultural projects (i.e., those that have privileged access to them) is enough to maximize overall happiness, even though the lives of a bigger group of people are made only marginally happy, due to limited access to basic necessities.
Another relevant question here is: Will a commitment to maximizing happiness equally for everyone NECESSARILY result in Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion? Perhaps it’s possible to subscribe to utilitarianism’s general mandate for moral action, emphasizing equal access to happiness for the greatest number, but that WON’T necessarily result in the growth of “billions and billions” of people (i.e., “World C or Z”), all less well-off than World A’s one billion flourishing people. To make such a case, you would need to research what actually results from spreading wealth around the globe more equally, through foreign aid, debt relief, charity, investment, etc. Do populations actually shrink as a result of such assistance, or is the result closer to Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion?
You might also wonder if we can avoid this whole Repugnant Conclusion problem by just abandoning utilitarianism’s commitment to maximizing happiness for the greatest number, opting for a different moral framework like Virtue Ethics, Care Ethics, Deontology (Kantian Duty Ethics), or something else. For that angle, I’ll save words here and direct you to the final paragraph of Section 1 of the Stanford Encyclopedia article “Arriving at the Repugnant Conclusion” (5).
Finally, a concern I have about this discussion is the tendency of participants to focus on the human happiness picture exclusively. Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion thought experiment doesn’t address the importance of animal welfare, as if the Moral Status of Animals were merely an inconvenient afterthought (8); nor is Biodiversity (9) or Biodiversity Preservation (10) factored into the overall flourishing of any of these hypothetical worlds. In our real world, decades of scientific investigation has clarified how the ecosystems of the Earth (upon which all life depends) are more fragile and threatened than we previously thought. Related research has also taught us much more about animal suffering at the hands of humans (in factory farms, for example). Now that we know so much more about their biology, emotions, and their social lives, we have fewer excuses for ignoring their interests in our moral deliberations. Perhaps we should also ask: In calculating overall happiness, what moral consideration do we owe to non-human animals and to the fragile ecosystems on which they (and we) depend? Does the repugnance of Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion also include moral consideration for the flourishing of sentient animals?
Check out a nice New York Times Op Ed on why Ethics Bowls are regenerative and nourishing of democracy, while traditional debates corrosive and undermining.
As a reader of EthicsBowl.org, chances are good you already appreciate as much. But many don’t, so share widely, and kudos to community leaders Jonathan Ellis and Francesca Hovagimian for taking the time to publish the piece.
Jade lives near an old graveyard (no new burials in decades), and walks her dog there, even though it’s against the law. Sometimes headstones emit steam, and Jade swears she’s heard moans coming from the ground. No, not really. But walking her dog there really is illegal. Should she continue?
Before answering, remember that good law tracks morality, but doesn’t determine it. That is, just because something is legal doesn’t mean it’s necessarily moral (consider slavery, once fully legal), and just because something is illegal doesn’t mean it’s necessarily immoral (consider when it was illegal for women to vote). The law states what’s legal, not necessarily what’s moral. So don’t fall into the common trap of basing morality on legality – the two are related, but distinct. In fact, every so often (OK, continuously) people need to reflect in order to clarify what the law should say, to ensure it continues to better align with morality.
Jade’s not dealing with anything as consequential as slavery or suffrage – just a little doggie exercise. But while she might be quiet and respectful, pick up after her dog and not do any obvious harm (after all, the residents are dead… even if they sometimes moan), her presence may signal to less reverent pet owners that it’s OK for them to break the law, too. Before you know it, dogs are marking their territory on headstones, digging up graves, fighting over human hip bones – not pretty. There’s also a risk (however distant) that a family member could show up and cause a scene. “Let go of my great-grandmother’s pearls, you beast!!”
The crux of the case in favor: “[G]iven that the law was probably written to respect family members’ grief and to enable them to honor their loved ones in peace, it seems that the spirit of the rule doesn’t really apply.” Jade would be giving her dog some much-needed exercise, and she seems exceptionally polite and thoughtful. Maybe her presence actually honors the graves? Maybe many of the deceased were pet lovers?
So which is it – should Jade continue walking her dog in the cemetery, maybe with certain conditions (and an exorcist)? Or should she refrain? And most importantly, why?
Are you studying the IEB or NHSEB case pool? Have a take you’re
willing to share?
Send it (written or video – your choice) to matt (at) mattdeaton.com and we’ll gladly share it.
Nothing especially fancy required – the point is simply to give teams something to chew on – a little outside input to inform their analysis and bowl prep.
Don’t be shy. You’ll be glad you did it, and so will your fellow ethics bowl enthusiasts.
The 2019-2020 National High School Ethics Bowl regionals case pool has been out for a couple of weeks now. If you’ve not downloaded your copy, get it at NHSEB.unc.edu here.
If you’re new, consider the tips here, and also check out the “How to Be an Ethics Bowl Coach” guide and other resources here. (Even if you’re a competitor rather than a coach, that stuff should prove helpful.)
If you need a primer on philosophical ethics, the open source ethics bowl version of Ethics in a Nutshell is here, and there are additional excellent resources on the NHSEB’s site here.
Happy ethics bowling, and stay tuned for analysis of select cases – requests welcome, as always.
